Wednesday, September 08, 2004
America Deserves Better # 26B
Dear Friends,
Please read the following, and then ask yourself if this is the kind of government you want. Surely America deserves better.
Sincerely, Murray
By Nat Hentoff
Were it not for the determination of Sens. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt. andCharles Grassley, R-Iowa, Attorney General John Ashcroft would still be preventing the public from knowing the allegations of an FBI whistleblower that the agency has been covering up its own incompetence that is dangerous to national security. The dismissed accuser, Sibel Edmonds
a linguist and translator with expertise in Mideast languages -was hired by the FBI soon after Sept. 11. As the Boston Globe recently reported: "Sifting through old classified materials in the days after the Sept. 11,2001, attacks, (Emonds) said, she made an alarming discovery: Intercepts relevant to the terrorist plot, including references to skyscrapers, had been overlooked because they were badly translated into English."
Moreover, on Oct. 27, 2002, Edmonds told a CBS- TV "60 Minutes" reporter that there was a large backlog of untrallslated FBI interviewswith possible terrorists, as well as wiretaps. But she was told to do her work slowly so that the FBI could geta bigger budget to hire more translators. For her industrious whistle-blowing, Edmonds was fired in March 2002.
Taking up her cause, Sell. Grassley told "60 Minutes" that Edmonds' accusations were "absolutely credible," adding that the FBI, with its pattern of concealing its weaknesses, "needs to be turned upside down." Edmonds sued to get her
job and her reputation back. But, so intent was the Justice Department to deep-six her case that, in May of this year (as reported by 9/11 Citizens Watch) "the FBI retroactively classified information about Edmonds' claims provided to congressional staff more than two years ago."
Accordingly, senators involved in her case had "to remove previously public material from their Web sites." On July 6, it looked as if this gag rule might become permanent when Judge Reggie Waltoll of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Edmonds' lawsuit on the basis of Ashcroft having invoked the rarely used "state secrets privilege."
But Sells. Leahy and Grassley were not deterred. In a July 9 letter to Ashcroft, Justice Department Inspector General Glenn Fine and FBI Director Robert Mueller, the senators said . they knew of Fine's investigative reportS on Edmonds' allegations wanted to see them.
Seeing that letter, I called the Inspector General's office and was told that a copy of the reports would be sent to those senators, who have security clearance, but the public would not have access. The reports have arrived, but the senators are forbidden to disclose any of that information to the public because the reports remain classified.
But the Inspector General's spokesman tells me that Fine is working with the Justice Department and the FBI to permit declassified sections of those reports to become available to the rest of us. That this administration overclassifies information has long been a complaint of the press and members of Congress. But the reclassification of previously public access to Edmonds' charges has been described by attorney Michael Kirkpatrick of Public Citizen in stinging terms to the Project on Government Oversight:
"We have been doing national security litigation for more than 30 years, and in our view, this is the most egregious misuse of the classification authority we've seen. Classification is to keep secret information that is sensitive. It is not to suppress debate over (previously) widely public information. Yet that is exactly what Ashcroft is doing."
Adds Edmonds: This is part of "John Ashcroft's relentless fight against me, and my information." This fight is also directed against what is now quaintly known as "the public's right to know" in our essential oversight responsibility over our government as responsible citizens.
-Nat Hentoff is a nationally renowned authority on the First Amendmentand the Bill of Rights.
Please read the following, and then ask yourself if this is the kind of government you want. Surely America deserves better.
Sincerely, Murray
By Nat Hentoff
Were it not for the determination of Sens. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt. andCharles Grassley, R-Iowa, Attorney General John Ashcroft would still be preventing the public from knowing the allegations of an FBI whistleblower that the agency has been covering up its own incompetence that is dangerous to national security. The dismissed accuser, Sibel Edmonds
a linguist and translator with expertise in Mideast languages -was hired by the FBI soon after Sept. 11. As the Boston Globe recently reported: "Sifting through old classified materials in the days after the Sept. 11,2001, attacks, (Emonds) said, she made an alarming discovery: Intercepts relevant to the terrorist plot, including references to skyscrapers, had been overlooked because they were badly translated into English."
Moreover, on Oct. 27, 2002, Edmonds told a CBS- TV "60 Minutes" reporter that there was a large backlog of untrallslated FBI interviewswith possible terrorists, as well as wiretaps. But she was told to do her work slowly so that the FBI could geta bigger budget to hire more translators. For her industrious whistle-blowing, Edmonds was fired in March 2002.
Taking up her cause, Sell. Grassley told "60 Minutes" that Edmonds' accusations were "absolutely credible," adding that the FBI, with its pattern of concealing its weaknesses, "needs to be turned upside down." Edmonds sued to get her
job and her reputation back. But, so intent was the Justice Department to deep-six her case that, in May of this year (as reported by 9/11 Citizens Watch) "the FBI retroactively classified information about Edmonds' claims provided to congressional staff more than two years ago."
Accordingly, senators involved in her case had "to remove previously public material from their Web sites." On July 6, it looked as if this gag rule might become permanent when Judge Reggie Waltoll of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Edmonds' lawsuit on the basis of Ashcroft having invoked the rarely used "state secrets privilege."
But Sells. Leahy and Grassley were not deterred. In a July 9 letter to Ashcroft, Justice Department Inspector General Glenn Fine and FBI Director Robert Mueller, the senators said . they knew of Fine's investigative reportS on Edmonds' allegations wanted to see them.
Seeing that letter, I called the Inspector General's office and was told that a copy of the reports would be sent to those senators, who have security clearance, but the public would not have access. The reports have arrived, but the senators are forbidden to disclose any of that information to the public because the reports remain classified.
But the Inspector General's spokesman tells me that Fine is working with the Justice Department and the FBI to permit declassified sections of those reports to become available to the rest of us. That this administration overclassifies information has long been a complaint of the press and members of Congress. But the reclassification of previously public access to Edmonds' charges has been described by attorney Michael Kirkpatrick of Public Citizen in stinging terms to the Project on Government Oversight:
"We have been doing national security litigation for more than 30 years, and in our view, this is the most egregious misuse of the classification authority we've seen. Classification is to keep secret information that is sensitive. It is not to suppress debate over (previously) widely public information. Yet that is exactly what Ashcroft is doing."
Adds Edmonds: This is part of "John Ashcroft's relentless fight against me, and my information." This fight is also directed against what is now quaintly known as "the public's right to know" in our essential oversight responsibility over our government as responsible citizens.
-Nat Hentoff is a nationally renowned authority on the First Amendmentand the Bill of Rights.
America Deserves Better # 26
Dear Friends,
I am not saying that the outrageous cover-ups detailed in this letter wouldn't have happened under a different administration. After an event like 9/11 some people are going to do anything to cover their asses. However, it did happen under this administration, and then high level people all the way up to the Attorney General continued the cover-up, even invoking national security and gagging Ms. Edmonds to do so. (See letter 26B). How can we have an administration that, on the one hand continually invokes orange alerts, and on the other hand permits a key link in the anti-terrorist chain to continue to malfunction? Those of you who believe Bush is doing a great job of fighting the war on terror might want to rethink your position. America deserves better. Defeat this administration, and if we succeed in defeating this administration, hold Kerry's feet to the fire to do better.
Best regards, Murray
Letter to Thomas Kean from Sibel Edmonds
Dear Chairman Kean:
It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September 11 [2001], during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism", and has now issued its "9-11 Commission Report". You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report, its recommendations, and implementation of these recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus I must assume that other serious issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our national security, we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American citizen, a former FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a United States congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice inspector general investigation, and a witness for your own 9-11 Commission investigation, request your answers to, and your public acknowledgement of, the following questions and issues:
After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at the FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down, even stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of "extensive backlog of untranslated documents", and justify its request for budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed translated information, hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS 60 Minutes transcript dated October 2002, and provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Senator [Charles] Grassley's and Senator [Patrick] Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed report has been reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, almost three years after [September 11], and more than two years since this information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to this most serious issue, has forgone any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which when left unaddressed will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and this serious issue despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish translator, was hired by the FBI after September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the bureau's investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used to work for a semi-legit organizations that were the FBI's targets of investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with two individuals who were FBI's targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as "Not Pertinent". Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to certain [September 11-related] detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret Clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the bureau if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen's case (FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Senator Leahy's and Grassley's letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassley's statement on CBS 60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This Dickerson incident received major coverage by the press (please refer to media background provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). According to [FBI] director [Robert] Mueller, the inspector general criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue this espionage report regarding Melek Can Dickerson (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and additional documents (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departments' security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic-language units of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence investigations. Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has forgone any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this serious information security breach and highly likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important "chit-chats" and "chatters" are being intentionally blocked. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting four to five major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counter-terrorism Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing "302" forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the special agent in charge, and after [September 11] the agents and the translators were told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice inspector general. The press reported this incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing (please refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, location, witness names, and the contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information (please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your investigators during a 2.5 hours' testimony by Mr Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice inspector general with specific information regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).
After almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the [September 11] attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the "use of airplanes", "major US cities as targets", and "Osama bin Laden issuing the order". Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet your report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered as one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned, despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even director Mueller by refraining from asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during your hearing (please remember that you ran out of questions during your hearings with director Mueller and [Attorney General] John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a "time limit" excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve these problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Over two years ago, and after two "unclassified" sessions with FBI officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of unqualified translators in charge of translating high level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not understand or speak even elementary-level English. He had failed English-proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI Headquarters as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everybody in FBI Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist-related information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic-language detainees (Turkish, Uzbek, Turkmen, etc). The FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack plans from these detainees, and yet the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this information. Further, these detainees were either released or detained or prosecuted based on information received and translated by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case (please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). CBS 60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and stated his name as one of the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed by the FBI (please refer to CBS 60 Minutes transcript provided to your investigators). Department of Justice inspector general had a detailed account of these problems (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS 60 Minutes broadcast Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish- and Turkic-language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the FBI's hiring department and those who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments and remain in their positions. Yet your report does not mention this case, or these chronic problems within the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI's hiring and screening departments. The issue of accountability for those responsible for these practices that endangers our national security is not brought up even once in your report. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve the intentional continuation of ineptitude and incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent from a [city name omitted] field office, re-sent a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This special agent, in light of the [September 11] terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided not to send the re-translated information to the special agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language department. The FBI agent requesting the re-translation never received the accurate translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). This information was also provided to the Department of Justice inspector general (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).
Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11, while many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, and to investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible connections to the attack, and those who might be planning possible future attacks, the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record of previous misconducts. After this supervisor's several severe misconducts were reported to the FBI's higher-level management, after his conducts were reported to the Inspector General's Office, to the United States Congress, and to the 9-11 Commission, he was promoted to include the FBI's Arabic-language unit under his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit receiving those chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing the [September 11] terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our lives for their career advancement and security. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite all the evidence and briefings you received? Why does your report adamantly refrain from assigning any accountability to any individuals responsible for our past and current failures? How can budget increases address and resolve these intentional acts committed by self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between intelligence agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of intelligence, and has not been told that certain information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities, is not given to or shared with counter-terrorism units, their investigations, and countering terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to [September 11], and remains in effect after [September 11]. If counter-intelligence receives information that contains money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities, directly linked to terrorist activities, and if that information involves certain nations, certain semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political relations in this country, then that information is not shared with counter-terrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited "direct pressure by the State Department", and in other cases "sensitive diplomatic relations" is cited. The Department of Justice inspector general received detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
After almost three years the American people still do not know that thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of "protecting certain foreign business relations". The victims' family members still do not realize that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and disguised under "safeguarding certain diplomatic relations". Your report did not even attempt to address these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed under any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding these unspoken and unwritten policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and understanding of certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist related activities, committed by certain US officials and high-level government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct, although under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How can budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, override these unwritten policies and unspoken practices incompatible with our national security?
I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems. Translation units are the front line in gathering, translating, and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack may, and probably will, come in the form of a message or document in foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given to the translation unit headed and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even stops, translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department, who has participated in certain criminal activities and security breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up failures and criminal conducts within the department, so it may never be translated in time if ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen, or another unqualified translator; so it may never be translated correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer within the language department; so it may never be translated fully, if at all. That message may come to the attention of an agent of a foreign organization who works as a translator in the FBI translation department, who may choose to block it; so it may never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell family members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.
I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's translation unit during the most crucial times after the [September 11] terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems and cases within the bureau's language units, and in light of what has already been established as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts, incidents, and problems cited in this letter are by no means based upon personal opinion or un-verified allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents were found confirmed by a senior Republican senator, Charles Grassley, and a senior Democrat senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice inspector general's report on my allegations, "none of my allegations were disproved". As you are fully aware, even FBI officials "confirmed all my allegations and denied none" during their unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, neither your commission's hearings, nor your commission's 567-page report, nor your recommendations include these serious issues, major incidents, and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote 25). Yet your commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete and deficient report.
In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all visible symptoms. Your commission's investigations, hearings, and report have chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing "visible", because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing "visible" because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms, and chose not to include them in its 567-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre-[September 11], without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence system, without assigning any accountability whatsoever, and therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with a rotten root, without first treating the root, and without first cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.
Respectfully
Sibel D Edmonds
CC: Senate Judiciary Committee
CC: Senate Intelligence Committee
CC: House Government Reform Committee
CC: Family Steering Committee
CC: Press
I am not saying that the outrageous cover-ups detailed in this letter wouldn't have happened under a different administration. After an event like 9/11 some people are going to do anything to cover their asses. However, it did happen under this administration, and then high level people all the way up to the Attorney General continued the cover-up, even invoking national security and gagging Ms. Edmonds to do so. (See letter 26B). How can we have an administration that, on the one hand continually invokes orange alerts, and on the other hand permits a key link in the anti-terrorist chain to continue to malfunction? Those of you who believe Bush is doing a great job of fighting the war on terror might want to rethink your position. America deserves better. Defeat this administration, and if we succeed in defeating this administration, hold Kerry's feet to the fire to do better.
Best regards, Murray
Letter to Thomas Kean from Sibel Edmonds
Dear Chairman Kean:
It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September 11 [2001], during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism", and has now issued its "9-11 Commission Report". You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report, its recommendations, and implementation of these recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus I must assume that other serious issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our national security, we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American citizen, a former FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a United States congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice inspector general investigation, and a witness for your own 9-11 Commission investigation, request your answers to, and your public acknowledgement of, the following questions and issues:
After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at the FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down, even stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of "extensive backlog of untranslated documents", and justify its request for budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed translated information, hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS 60 Minutes transcript dated October 2002, and provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Senator [Charles] Grassley's and Senator [Patrick] Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed report has been reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, almost three years after [September 11], and more than two years since this information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to this most serious issue, has forgone any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which when left unaddressed will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and this serious issue despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish translator, was hired by the FBI after September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the bureau's investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used to work for a semi-legit organizations that were the FBI's targets of investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with two individuals who were FBI's targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as "Not Pertinent". Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to certain [September 11-related] detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret Clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the bureau if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen's case (FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Senator Leahy's and Grassley's letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassley's statement on CBS 60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This Dickerson incident received major coverage by the press (please refer to media background provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). According to [FBI] director [Robert] Mueller, the inspector general criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue this espionage report regarding Melek Can Dickerson (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and additional documents (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departments' security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic-language units of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence investigations. Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has forgone any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this serious information security breach and highly likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important "chit-chats" and "chatters" are being intentionally blocked. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting four to five major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counter-terrorism Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing "302" forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the special agent in charge, and after [September 11] the agents and the translators were told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice inspector general. The press reported this incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing (please refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, location, witness names, and the contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information (please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your investigators during a 2.5 hours' testimony by Mr Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice inspector general with specific information regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).
After almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the [September 11] attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the "use of airplanes", "major US cities as targets", and "Osama bin Laden issuing the order". Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet your report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered as one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned, despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even director Mueller by refraining from asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during your hearing (please remember that you ran out of questions during your hearings with director Mueller and [Attorney General] John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a "time limit" excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve these problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
Over two years ago, and after two "unclassified" sessions with FBI officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of unqualified translators in charge of translating high level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not understand or speak even elementary-level English. He had failed English-proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI Headquarters as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everybody in FBI Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist-related information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic-language detainees (Turkish, Uzbek, Turkmen, etc). The FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack plans from these detainees, and yet the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this information. Further, these detainees were either released or detained or prosecuted based on information received and translated by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case (please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). CBS 60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and stated his name as one of the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed by the FBI (please refer to CBS 60 Minutes transcript provided to your investigators). Department of Justice inspector general had a detailed account of these problems (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS 60 Minutes broadcast Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish- and Turkic-language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the FBI's hiring department and those who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments and remain in their positions. Yet your report does not mention this case, or these chronic problems within the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI's hiring and screening departments. The issue of accountability for those responsible for these practices that endangers our national security is not brought up even once in your report. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve the intentional continuation of ineptitude and incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent from a [city name omitted] field office, re-sent a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This special agent, in light of the [September 11] terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided not to send the re-translated information to the special agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language department. The FBI agent requesting the re-translation never received the accurate translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). This information was also provided to the Department of Justice inspector general (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).
Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11, while many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, and to investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible connections to the attack, and those who might be planning possible future attacks, the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record of previous misconducts. After this supervisor's several severe misconducts were reported to the FBI's higher-level management, after his conducts were reported to the Inspector General's Office, to the United States Congress, and to the 9-11 Commission, he was promoted to include the FBI's Arabic-language unit under his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit receiving those chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing the [September 11] terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our lives for their career advancement and security. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite all the evidence and briefings you received? Why does your report adamantly refrain from assigning any accountability to any individuals responsible for our past and current failures? How can budget increases address and resolve these intentional acts committed by self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?
The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between intelligence agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of intelligence, and has not been told that certain information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities, is not given to or shared with counter-terrorism units, their investigations, and countering terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to [September 11], and remains in effect after [September 11]. If counter-intelligence receives information that contains money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities, directly linked to terrorist activities, and if that information involves certain nations, certain semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political relations in this country, then that information is not shared with counter-terrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited "direct pressure by the State Department", and in other cases "sensitive diplomatic relations" is cited. The Department of Justice inspector general received detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).
After almost three years the American people still do not know that thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of "protecting certain foreign business relations". The victims' family members still do not realize that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and disguised under "safeguarding certain diplomatic relations". Your report did not even attempt to address these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed under any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding these unspoken and unwritten policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and understanding of certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist related activities, committed by certain US officials and high-level government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct, although under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How can budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, override these unwritten policies and unspoken practices incompatible with our national security?
I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems. Translation units are the front line in gathering, translating, and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack may, and probably will, come in the form of a message or document in foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given to the translation unit headed and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even stops, translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department, who has participated in certain criminal activities and security breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up failures and criminal conducts within the department, so it may never be translated in time if ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen, or another unqualified translator; so it may never be translated correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer within the language department; so it may never be translated fully, if at all. That message may come to the attention of an agent of a foreign organization who works as a translator in the FBI translation department, who may choose to block it; so it may never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell family members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.
I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's translation unit during the most crucial times after the [September 11] terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems and cases within the bureau's language units, and in light of what has already been established as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts, incidents, and problems cited in this letter are by no means based upon personal opinion or un-verified allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents were found confirmed by a senior Republican senator, Charles Grassley, and a senior Democrat senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice inspector general's report on my allegations, "none of my allegations were disproved". As you are fully aware, even FBI officials "confirmed all my allegations and denied none" during their unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, neither your commission's hearings, nor your commission's 567-page report, nor your recommendations include these serious issues, major incidents, and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote 25). Yet your commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete and deficient report.
In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all visible symptoms. Your commission's investigations, hearings, and report have chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing "visible", because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing "visible" because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms, and chose not to include them in its 567-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre-[September 11], without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence system, without assigning any accountability whatsoever, and therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with a rotten root, without first treating the root, and without first cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.
Respectfully
Sibel D Edmonds
CC: Senate Judiciary Committee
CC: Senate Intelligence Committee
CC: House Government Reform Committee
CC: Family Steering Committee
CC: Press
America Deserves Better # 25
Dear friends,
Following is an excerpt from the August Scientific American. The whole article gives a balanced comparison of nuclear vs conventional weapons for bunker busting, but misses two key points and underplays the third, following:
1)Who are we likely to need to use bunker busters against?
2)Given the downwind fallout probability from a nuclear bunker buster (see below), all our unidentified enemy would have to do is put his bunkers under urban areas to tie our hands anyway.
3)We could not know how effective such weapons would be, nor how much fallout they would really cause without testing, and that would be in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
I had no idea, until I read this, that this administration is gearing to start up the nuclear arms race again. This is the worst example I have seen yet of their irresponsible "Empire mentality". The specific program is a back door way of using a weapon we don't need, and probably couldn't use in any case, to get back into an activity that more responsible leaders, including the President's father, had long since disavowed.
I am sure the staunchest of the good Christian Republicans among you would be opposed to this initiative, and I would ask you to discuss this matter with your congregations.
Both America and the world deserve better than this, the most urgent reason yet that I have seen to defeat this administration.
Yours in horror and revulsion, Murray
Snip
Renewed interest in "nuclear bunker buster " bombs was revealed in the US "Nuclear Posture Review" of Dec., 2001, a classified defense document leaked to the press a few months afterward. The report advocated study of new nuclear military technologies to expand the strategic options available to the Pentagon. Under the auspices of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, $6.1 million was spent in 2003 for research on a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) bomb, followed by another $7.5 million in 2004. The administration plans to raise these appropriations sharply and spend $484.7 million between 2005 and 2009. At the same time, Congress has approved an Advanced Concepts Initiative, which will explore more exotic and more controversial variations on the same theme. To many observers, these substantial spending allocations and this breadth of research suggest that the administration has already tacitly committed to building RNEPs and is actively considering developing other types of nuclear bombs.
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Washington, D.C. based Arms Control Association, declared that "the Bush administration's do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do nuclear weapons policies contradict the U.S.'s NPT [NonProliferation Treaty] commitments and jeopardize the future of the treaty." Other critics have derided the concept of small nuclear weapons as "immaculate preemption," unconvinced that even a comparatively small nuclear explosion could yield useful results without leaving an unacceptably nasty mess.
Some weapons designers have argued that low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear arms, with explosive yields ranging from the equivalent of 10 to 1,000 tons of TNT , would provide unique tactical and strategic capabilities while minimizing unwanted collateral effects in particular, the atomic fallout typically generated in abundance by more powerful bombs. Shifting from big nuclear devices that burst at the earth's surface to smaller ones that detonate below ground could indeed reduce the radioactive fallout released by a factor of about 20 – but it would by no means make the smaller munitions clean.
By decreasing the explosive power required to terminate a buried target, the use of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons lessens the amount of incidental radioactive fallout. Four scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory (Bryan L. Fearey, Paul C. White, John St. Ledger and John D. Immele) recently estimated in the journal Comparative Strategy that a small nuclear bomb that penetrated the ground 10 meters before exploding could be roughly 1/40th the size of a bomb detonated at the surface, and still achieve its goal. But is that reduction sufficient to contemplate deploying earth-penetrating nuclear bombs? According to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment's report "The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions," fully containing the fallout from a one-kiloton nuclear weapon requires detonating it 90 meters underground in a carefully sealed cavity. Today's best penetrator missiles can reach a depth of only about six meters in dry rock, and as Robert W. Nelson of Princeton University has argued in Physics Today, limits on the strengths of materials suggest that 20 meters might be a theoretical maximum.
These figures leave little doubt that use of a nuclear bunker buster would spread fallout; in an urban area, a kiloton size bomb could kill tens of thousands. .Consider a one-kiloton bunker buster bomb set off at relatively shallow depth less than 10 meters in wind conditions averaging 10 kilometers an hour. Although the numbers will vary slightly depending on detonation depth, geology and weapon details, the basic results will be similar. If it takes six hours for people in the vicinity to evacuate, then calculations show that nearly everyone downwind of the blast within approximately five kilometers would still be killed by fallout, and half the inhabitants eight kilometers away would die. Only if the nearest population center is 10 or more kilometers downwind will the fallout lead to few if any rapid fatalities. Even if the number of casualties were small, extensive areas adjacent to the blast zone would be contaminated with radioactivity.
One crucial question is whether new tactical nuclear weapons can be developed without resuming nuclear testing, which would clearly be in defiance of the NNP treaty. In 1993 Congress enacted a prohibition-called the Spratt-Furse ban-against any research that could lead to a new, small, nuclear weapon, one with a yield of less than five kilotons. Led by Representative John Spratt of South Carolina and then Representative Elizabeth Furse of Oregon the legislature sought to continue the moratorium on nuclear testing begun by President George H. W. Bush. Some of the lawmakers also sought to forestall nascent efforts to build a new generation of small nuclear arms.
Some defenders of the ban argued that these substantially new weapons systems would require demonstrations to certify them. According to this line of reasoning, repeal of the Spratt-Furse prohibition would constitute the first step toward a resumption of nuclear testing, threatening international arms control efforts. In May 2003, in a near party-line vote, the Spratt-Furse ban was repealed. snip
Following is an excerpt from the August Scientific American. The whole article gives a balanced comparison of nuclear vs conventional weapons for bunker busting, but misses two key points and underplays the third, following:
1)Who are we likely to need to use bunker busters against?
2)Given the downwind fallout probability from a nuclear bunker buster (see below), all our unidentified enemy would have to do is put his bunkers under urban areas to tie our hands anyway.
3)We could not know how effective such weapons would be, nor how much fallout they would really cause without testing, and that would be in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
I had no idea, until I read this, that this administration is gearing to start up the nuclear arms race again. This is the worst example I have seen yet of their irresponsible "Empire mentality". The specific program is a back door way of using a weapon we don't need, and probably couldn't use in any case, to get back into an activity that more responsible leaders, including the President's father, had long since disavowed.
I am sure the staunchest of the good Christian Republicans among you would be opposed to this initiative, and I would ask you to discuss this matter with your congregations.
Both America and the world deserve better than this, the most urgent reason yet that I have seen to defeat this administration.
Yours in horror and revulsion, Murray
Snip
Renewed interest in "nuclear bunker buster " bombs was revealed in the US "Nuclear Posture Review" of Dec., 2001, a classified defense document leaked to the press a few months afterward. The report advocated study of new nuclear military technologies to expand the strategic options available to the Pentagon. Under the auspices of the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, $6.1 million was spent in 2003 for research on a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) bomb, followed by another $7.5 million in 2004. The administration plans to raise these appropriations sharply and spend $484.7 million between 2005 and 2009. At the same time, Congress has approved an Advanced Concepts Initiative, which will explore more exotic and more controversial variations on the same theme. To many observers, these substantial spending allocations and this breadth of research suggest that the administration has already tacitly committed to building RNEPs and is actively considering developing other types of nuclear bombs.
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Washington, D.C. based Arms Control Association, declared that "the Bush administration's do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do nuclear weapons policies contradict the U.S.'s NPT [NonProliferation Treaty] commitments and jeopardize the future of the treaty." Other critics have derided the concept of small nuclear weapons as "immaculate preemption," unconvinced that even a comparatively small nuclear explosion could yield useful results without leaving an unacceptably nasty mess.
Some weapons designers have argued that low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear arms, with explosive yields ranging from the equivalent of 10 to 1,000 tons of TNT , would provide unique tactical and strategic capabilities while minimizing unwanted collateral effects in particular, the atomic fallout typically generated in abundance by more powerful bombs. Shifting from big nuclear devices that burst at the earth's surface to smaller ones that detonate below ground could indeed reduce the radioactive fallout released by a factor of about 20 – but it would by no means make the smaller munitions clean.
By decreasing the explosive power required to terminate a buried target, the use of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons lessens the amount of incidental radioactive fallout. Four scientists from Los Alamos National Laboratory (Bryan L. Fearey, Paul C. White, John St. Ledger and John D. Immele) recently estimated in the journal Comparative Strategy that a small nuclear bomb that penetrated the ground 10 meters before exploding could be roughly 1/40th the size of a bomb detonated at the surface, and still achieve its goal. But is that reduction sufficient to contemplate deploying earth-penetrating nuclear bombs? According to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment's report "The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions," fully containing the fallout from a one-kiloton nuclear weapon requires detonating it 90 meters underground in a carefully sealed cavity. Today's best penetrator missiles can reach a depth of only about six meters in dry rock, and as Robert W. Nelson of Princeton University has argued in Physics Today, limits on the strengths of materials suggest that 20 meters might be a theoretical maximum.
These figures leave little doubt that use of a nuclear bunker buster would spread fallout; in an urban area, a kiloton size bomb could kill tens of thousands. .Consider a one-kiloton bunker buster bomb set off at relatively shallow depth less than 10 meters in wind conditions averaging 10 kilometers an hour. Although the numbers will vary slightly depending on detonation depth, geology and weapon details, the basic results will be similar. If it takes six hours for people in the vicinity to evacuate, then calculations show that nearly everyone downwind of the blast within approximately five kilometers would still be killed by fallout, and half the inhabitants eight kilometers away would die. Only if the nearest population center is 10 or more kilometers downwind will the fallout lead to few if any rapid fatalities. Even if the number of casualties were small, extensive areas adjacent to the blast zone would be contaminated with radioactivity.
One crucial question is whether new tactical nuclear weapons can be developed without resuming nuclear testing, which would clearly be in defiance of the NNP treaty. In 1993 Congress enacted a prohibition-called the Spratt-Furse ban-against any research that could lead to a new, small, nuclear weapon, one with a yield of less than five kilotons. Led by Representative John Spratt of South Carolina and then Representative Elizabeth Furse of Oregon the legislature sought to continue the moratorium on nuclear testing begun by President George H. W. Bush. Some of the lawmakers also sought to forestall nascent efforts to build a new generation of small nuclear arms.
Some defenders of the ban argued that these substantially new weapons systems would require demonstrations to certify them. According to this line of reasoning, repeal of the Spratt-Furse prohibition would constitute the first step toward a resumption of nuclear testing, threatening international arms control efforts. In May 2003, in a near party-line vote, the Spratt-Furse ban was repealed. snip
America Deserves Better # 27
Dear friends,
It is too long since I have addressed ADB. I have been busy with energy, my other preoccupation. Today one of my ADB correspondents sent me an article that nicely makes my next letter. This article addresses the most dangerous and repulsive aspect of the Bush administration. It reflects megalomania, pure and simple. The author of this piece underestimates the effect of vindicating the Vulcans' position through reelection of Bush. The next step for megalomania unchecked is increased aggression and atrocity abroad, and supression of dissent at home. Even tinpot dictators like Mussolini could pull that off. Bush himself may not have the will to such action, but the war in Iraq suggests otherwise, and never underestimate Cheney and Rumsfeldt.
Do we really need a "defense" (theres an Orwellian term for you) budget that equals the rest of the world's defense budgets combined? What threat could we possibly face that justifies such a travesty? Obviously the only possible such threat would be one of our own making, - turning the entire rest of the world aggressively against us. One can't imagine a more dangerous or more unAmerican posture for our nation.
Obviously we would be much better off with the military budget halved, the deficit sharply reduced, and a renewed network of allied nations. That won't happen if Bush is reelected.
Do we really want a government that follows the warped writings of of an extremist middle-east mind, the kind of mind that we just expended a fortune to remove from Iraq? America deserves better. Defeat this administration.
Sincerely yours, Murray
Beware the Vulcans: Why this US Vote is so Critical
August 26, 2004 by the Globe and Mail/ Canada by Lawrence Martin
In his book The Rise of the Vulcans, James Mann writes of what he calls one of the most significant foreign policy documents in decades. Written in 1991 by the Pentagon's Zalmay Khalizad, the paper set forth "a new vision for a world dominated by a lone American superpower, actively working to make sure that no rival group or group of rivals would ever emerge."
Formal alliances were to be downgraded, and collective security given short shrift. American muscle would be the arbiter of the new world order.
Mr. Khalizad was part of a pack of Pentagon hard-liners -- or Vulcans, as some of them liked to call themselves -- that included Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz.
Though it is generally accepted that 9/11 triggered the changes in the world's power dynamic, these men had been plotting since the late 1960s, as the even-tempered Mann book reveals, to bring an end to great power diplomacy and the collective security system.
The Khalizad document became their bible and, when Ralph Nader handed the Republicans the White House in 2000, they began implementing its tenets. If they win the election this fall -- the most high-stakes election in memory -- they will try to finish the job.
The influence of the Vulcans has been pivotal. As the Cold War closed and their manifesto was being written, there were other options open to the United States. As they did after the Second World War, the Americans could have chosen to strengthen multilateral organizations and forge a new concept of collective security. They could have scaled back their overseas power and devoted resources to domestic afflictions. Some in Washington advocated big defense-spending cuts, with the savings going toward making America the real shining city on the hill -- one without the poverty and the glaring inequalities and the health-care shortages. But the cuts would have left the Pentagon with only 10 times the might of its average competitors, as opposed to 20. The Vulcans wanted 20.
George Bush Jr. took office speaking of the need for alliances and power-sharing. "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us," he said of the world's other nations. But when he surrounded himself with supporters of the Khalizad document, the die was cast. Unilateralism became a buzzword. The Iraq war -- largely a product of the enthusiasms and exaggerations of Mr. Cheney, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Wolfowitz -- signaled that the old balance-of-power system was going up in smoke, replaced by the new one-superpower world view.
For the United States, the irony is considerable. It has long held claim to being one of the great democracies. But what, as the critics ask, is democratic about one country running, if not subjugating, a world of more than 200 nations?
The election in November is so critical because it will be seen as either ratification or repudiation of Vulcan unilateralism. On the face of it, the Democratic Party is hardly proposing radical change. John Kerry is fuzzy on Iraq and no dove on military spending. He ludicrously plans on increasing the already-hyperventilating Pentagon budget, making it the biggest in history when the military capacity of the enemy -- pockets of terrorists as opposed to giant armies and arsenals -- is the smallest in history.
But Mr. Kerry is running to the right of how he would govern. His heavily liberal record is that of an internationalist. A victory by him would signal a major attitudinal shift. As he makes ringingly clear, he wants to rebuild alliances, reinvigorate the concept of collective security and make America respected in the world again.
While Bush must be somewhat chastened by the "weapons of mass destruction" fiasco, by the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and by the thousands of deaths his war has engendered, he would see victory as vindication. Other nations would recoil. They would fear more politics of confrontation, more polarization, more war. Hatred for America would escalate.
There would be no search for a new internationalism favored by Canada and other nations because, as The Rise of the Vulcans makes clear, the Vulcans' underlying philosophy is that they need not reach accommodation with anyone.
They are an odd breed, these men. They hate dictatorship, unless they're doing the dictating.
It is too long since I have addressed ADB. I have been busy with energy, my other preoccupation. Today one of my ADB correspondents sent me an article that nicely makes my next letter. This article addresses the most dangerous and repulsive aspect of the Bush administration. It reflects megalomania, pure and simple. The author of this piece underestimates the effect of vindicating the Vulcans' position through reelection of Bush. The next step for megalomania unchecked is increased aggression and atrocity abroad, and supression of dissent at home. Even tinpot dictators like Mussolini could pull that off. Bush himself may not have the will to such action, but the war in Iraq suggests otherwise, and never underestimate Cheney and Rumsfeldt.
Do we really need a "defense" (theres an Orwellian term for you) budget that equals the rest of the world's defense budgets combined? What threat could we possibly face that justifies such a travesty? Obviously the only possible such threat would be one of our own making, - turning the entire rest of the world aggressively against us. One can't imagine a more dangerous or more unAmerican posture for our nation.
Obviously we would be much better off with the military budget halved, the deficit sharply reduced, and a renewed network of allied nations. That won't happen if Bush is reelected.
Do we really want a government that follows the warped writings of of an extremist middle-east mind, the kind of mind that we just expended a fortune to remove from Iraq? America deserves better. Defeat this administration.
Sincerely yours, Murray
Beware the Vulcans: Why this US Vote is so Critical
August 26, 2004 by the Globe and Mail
In his book The Rise of the Vulcans
Formal alliances were to be downgraded, and collective security given short shrift. American muscle would be the arbiter of the new world order.
Mr. Khalizad was part of a pack of Pentagon hard-liners -- or Vulcans, as some of them liked to call themselves -- that included Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz.
Though it is generally accepted that 9/11 triggered the changes in the world's power dynamic, these men had been plotting since the late 1960s, as the even-tempered Mann book reveals, to bring an end to great power diplomacy and the collective security system.
The Khalizad document became their bible and, when Ralph Nader handed the Republicans the White House in 2000, they began implementing its tenets. If they win the election this fall -- the most high-stakes election in memory -- they will try to finish the job.
The influence of the Vulcans has been pivotal. As the Cold War closed and their manifesto was being written, there were other options open to the United States. As they did after the Second World War, the Americans could have chosen to strengthen multilateral organizations and forge a new concept of collective security. They could have scaled back their overseas power and devoted resources to domestic afflictions. Some in Washington advocated big defense-spending cuts, with the savings going toward making America the real shining city on the hill -- one without the poverty and the glaring inequalities and the health-care shortages. But the cuts would have left the Pentagon with only 10 times the might of its average competitors, as opposed to 20. The Vulcans wanted 20.
George Bush Jr. took office speaking of the need for alliances and power-sharing. "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us," he said of the world's other nations. But when he surrounded himself with supporters of the Khalizad document, the die was cast. Unilateralism became a buzzword. The Iraq war -- largely a product of the enthusiasms and exaggerations of Mr. Cheney, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Wolfowitz -- signaled that the old balance-of-power system was going up in smoke, replaced by the new one-superpower world view.
For the United States, the irony is considerable. It has long held claim to being one of the great democracies. But what, as the critics ask, is democratic about one country running, if not subjugating, a world of more than 200 nations?
The election in November is so critical because it will be seen as either ratification or repudiation of Vulcan unilateralism. On the face of it, the Democratic Party is hardly proposing radical change. John Kerry is fuzzy on Iraq and no dove on military spending. He ludicrously plans on increasing the already-hyperventilating Pentagon budget, making it the biggest in history when the military capacity of the enemy -- pockets of terrorists as opposed to giant armies and arsenals -- is the smallest in history.
But Mr. Kerry is running to the right of how he would govern. His heavily liberal record is that of an internationalist. A victory by him would signal a major attitudinal shift. As he makes ringingly clear, he wants to rebuild alliances, reinvigorate the concept of collective security and make America respected in the world again.
While Bush must be somewhat chastened by the "weapons of mass destruction" fiasco, by the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and by the thousands of deaths his war has engendered, he would see victory as vindication. Other nations would recoil. They would fear more politics of confrontation, more polarization, more war. Hatred for America would escalate.
There would be no search for a new internationalism favored by Canada and other nations because, as The Rise of the Vulcans
They are an odd breed, these men. They hate dictatorship, unless they're doing the dictating.
Tuesday, July 27, 2004
America Deserves Better # 24
Dear friends,
Just a short letter this time. I stumbled across a real clear and simple budget message at:
http://tinyurl.com/4ajmp or if the "tinyurl" doesn't work, you can cut and paste:
http://ww11.e-tractions.com/truemajority/servlet/Gamelet;jsessionid=DF6179634A347C46EA0730FF4EAD1CEF?req=BjEzO6PaM3E3tzM6bjEFtXM6B3Ef%2BWC3Q%2FmabjF9b9Z1ozMzGjEft2MzMjEFt3taB3Ef%2Ba5ZpiFkv4x%3D .
Obviously we will need more budget fixing than this to get rid of the deficit, but even these simple changes would provide a much better balance. Of course the only way we will start moving toward a better budget is to change the administration. America deserves better. Vote for a change in Nov.
All the best, Murray
Just a short letter this time. I stumbled across a real clear and simple budget message at:
http://tinyurl.com/4ajmp or if the "tinyurl" doesn't work, you can cut and paste:
http://ww11.e-tractions.com/truemajority/servlet/Gamelet;jsessionid=DF6179634A347C46EA0730FF4EAD1CEF?req=BjEzO6PaM3E3tzM6bjEFtXM6B3Ef%2BWC3Q%2FmabjF9b9Z1ozMzGjEft2MzMjEFt3taB3Ef%2Ba5ZpiFkv4x%3D .
Obviously we will need more budget fixing than this to get rid of the deficit, but even these simple changes would provide a much better balance. Of course the only way we will start moving toward a better budget is to change the administration. America deserves better. Vote for a change in Nov.
All the best, Murray
America Deserves Better # 23A
Dear friends,
Overnight my outrage at the intentional CIA deception grew, until this morning I sent the following letter to my 2 Senators. I urge, implore, beg you to send a similar letter to your Senators, and to ask all of your friends and their friend etc., to do the same.
Sincerely yours, Murray
Senator Ernest Hollings July 16, 2004
Re: The Senate Intelligence Committee report on prewar intelligence assessment on Iraq
Dear Senator Hollings,
So far I have only read Section III of the report, starting on page 84, in detail, but that is quite sufficient. This section deals with Iraq’s nuclear program, and is concerned mainly with the now famous aluminum tubes. The report available to me at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/iraq/documents.html is much censored, especially in the conclusions. What I can see leads me to believe that, in the interests of bipartisan unanimity, the Committee significantly understated the real conclusions. Whitewash may be too strong a word, but compromise is certainly applicable.
The 21 conclusions in this section, (conclusions 28 through 47 of the report) use phrases like "the conclusion was not supported by the evidence, the conclusion was incorrect, the conclusion had several equally likely explanations, some intelligence was more definitive than the NIE showed, the intelligence was more indicative of a non-nuclear program". In only 3 cases did the Committee use stronger wording:
Conclusion 24: the conclusion was incorrect, contradictory and a serious lapse
Conclusion 38: CIA reporting was at a minimum misleading, and in some cases incorrect
Conclusion 41: something (blacked out) was presented only with analysis that supported CIA views.
However a careful reading of the report reveals unequivocally that, from June 2001 through July 2002 the CIA produced at least 10 "Intelligence Reports" withheld from other agencies and making the case that the tubes were for gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Throughout this period the DOE disputed the CIA conclusions. Finally in Sept. 2002 both the CIA and DIA published reports supporting the gas centrifuge theory, and these reports were the basis of the Sept 2002 NIE that supported the Congressional Resolution that empowered President Bush. It is also unmistakeably clear that these reports contained conscious and intentional lies of selective information, omissions, fabrications, distortions, and outright falsifications, in addition to doubtful interpretations. The NIE conclusions were not so much based on poor intelligence as on purposeful disintelligence.
The CIA disintelligence campaign started in April 2001 and continued at least through May 2003, which can hardly be a coincidence. There are only two likely explanations. Either the CIA analysts were Neocon plants or sympathizers that finally saw their chance to influence events, or they were sycophants that responded to undue pressure to provide the intelligence their masters sought. In either case they should be taken into custody, charged and tried. The trial will reveal the correct conclusion.
Your loyalty to your Senate colleagues must not lead you to let things rest here. You owe it to the wives and mothers of South Carolina (nay, even the 6000 plus wives, widows and mothers in the nation) with maimed or dead husbands and sons, to dump the compromise and bring this situation into the full light of public attention. It is clear that Congress and the nation were misled with intentionally falsified "information" under the guise of intelligence, with the undeniable purpose of justifying an otherwise unsupportable war. Such deception must be illegal, and must not go unchallenged. Please begin action now to uncover and punish the miscreants ultimately responsible for this outrage. In the interest of a bipartisan effort, by copy of this letter, I am asking Senator Graham to join you in this effort.
Respectfully yours,
Murray Duffin
Overnight my outrage at the intentional CIA deception grew, until this morning I sent the following letter to my 2 Senators. I urge, implore, beg you to send a similar letter to your Senators, and to ask all of your friends and their friend etc., to do the same.
Sincerely yours, Murray
Senator Ernest Hollings July 16, 2004
Re: The Senate Intelligence Committee report on prewar intelligence assessment on Iraq
Dear Senator Hollings,
So far I have only read Section III of the report, starting on page 84, in detail, but that is quite sufficient. This section deals with Iraq’s nuclear program, and is concerned mainly with the now famous aluminum tubes. The report available to me at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/iraq/documents.html is much censored, especially in the conclusions. What I can see leads me to believe that, in the interests of bipartisan unanimity, the Committee significantly understated the real conclusions. Whitewash may be too strong a word, but compromise is certainly applicable.
The 21 conclusions in this section, (conclusions 28 through 47 of the report) use phrases like "the conclusion was not supported by the evidence, the conclusion was incorrect, the conclusion had several equally likely explanations, some intelligence was more definitive than the NIE showed, the intelligence was more indicative of a non-nuclear program". In only 3 cases did the Committee use stronger wording:
Conclusion 24: the conclusion was incorrect, contradictory and a serious lapse
Conclusion 38: CIA reporting was at a minimum misleading, and in some cases incorrect
Conclusion 41: something (blacked out) was presented only with analysis that supported CIA views.
However a careful reading of the report reveals unequivocally that, from June 2001 through July 2002 the CIA produced at least 10 "Intelligence Reports" withheld from other agencies and making the case that the tubes were for gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Throughout this period the DOE disputed the CIA conclusions. Finally in Sept. 2002 both the CIA and DIA published reports supporting the gas centrifuge theory, and these reports were the basis of the Sept 2002 NIE that supported the Congressional Resolution that empowered President Bush. It is also unmistakeably clear that these reports contained conscious and intentional lies of selective information, omissions, fabrications, distortions, and outright falsifications, in addition to doubtful interpretations. The NIE conclusions were not so much based on poor intelligence as on purposeful disintelligence.
The CIA disintelligence campaign started in April 2001 and continued at least through May 2003, which can hardly be a coincidence. There are only two likely explanations. Either the CIA analysts were Neocon plants or sympathizers that finally saw their chance to influence events, or they were sycophants that responded to undue pressure to provide the intelligence their masters sought. In either case they should be taken into custody, charged and tried. The trial will reveal the correct conclusion.
Your loyalty to your Senate colleagues must not lead you to let things rest here. You owe it to the wives and mothers of South Carolina (nay, even the 6000 plus wives, widows and mothers in the nation) with maimed or dead husbands and sons, to dump the compromise and bring this situation into the full light of public attention. It is clear that Congress and the nation were misled with intentionally falsified "information" under the guise of intelligence, with the undeniable purpose of justifying an otherwise unsupportable war. Such deception must be illegal, and must not go unchallenged. Please begin action now to uncover and punish the miscreants ultimately responsible for this outrage. In the interest of a bipartisan effort, by copy of this letter, I am asking Senator Graham to join you in this effort.
Respectfully yours,
Murray Duffin
America Deserves Better # 23
Dear Friends,
By now you have all heard at least a little bit about the Senate Intelligence Committee report on the evidence supporting The Bush administration's arguments for a war in Iraq. A bowdlerized version of the actual report can be found at:
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/iraq/documents.html
The committee concluded that faulty intelligence was the problem, and that there was no evidence that the intelligence community was pressured to come up with the desired story. As the report is over 500 pages long I have not read it all, but I did read one section in detail, the section dealing with Iraq's nuclear program. When you read this section, and the conclusions at the end of the section, it is clear that, in order to reach unanimity, the committee pulled their punches. It may not be a whitewash, but the conclusions are a far cry from the actuality.
The body of the report makes it clear that the CIA analysts who prepared the intelligence reports concerning the famous aluminum tubes consciously fabricated supposed intelligence, interpreted intelligence in unlikely ways that supported the desired conclusions, reported known data selectively, reported data falsely, ignored other reports or failed to mention known reports that disputed their conclusions, lied about other data, lied about the results of their own experiments and lied about other known uses of the tubes in question. Their "National Intelligence Assessment" was a farrago of lies, distortions, half truths, selective data and knowingly improbable analysis. The reinterpretation of the data started in April 2001, and reached a peak in Sept. 2002.
With one exception the wording of the committee's conclusions gets no stronger than to state that various conclusions were wrong.
There is no way that the conclusions were wrong due to faulty intelligence or to lack of "humint". The conclusions were the result of conscious distortions, omissions and fabrications, but that is never stated. The commitee's understatements come pretty close to whitewash.
One should ask oneself why the CIA began to consciously and falsely reinterpret their intelligence starting in April 2001 if they were under no pressure to do so. Remember Paul O'Neal's input that discussions of war on Iraq started at Bush's first cabinet meeting. Do you think that is a coincidence?
Regretably the media has played along with the game rather than exposing the real meat of the report. If any of you doubt me I beg you to read the report for yourself, or at least read the section on the Nuclear Program to assure yourself that I am not exaggerating.
The administration didn't simply act on poor intelligence, they acted on intelligence that was consciously changed and falsified, and that was done so only after this administration took office. You can reach your own conclusions. I conclude that there was pressure to produce the desired intelligence, and that sycophants in the intelligence community responded to that pressure as desired. Intelligence was clearly fabricated to persuade Congress to support a war of choice, a decision they would not otherwise have made.
We cannot let such deceit continue to be the basis for national policy. America deserves better. Defeat this administration.
Yours, in shock,
Murray
By now you have all heard at least a little bit about the Senate Intelligence Committee report on the evidence supporting The Bush administration's arguments for a war in Iraq. A bowdlerized version of the actual report can be found at:
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/iraq/documents.html
The committee concluded that faulty intelligence was the problem, and that there was no evidence that the intelligence community was pressured to come up with the desired story. As the report is over 500 pages long I have not read it all, but I did read one section in detail, the section dealing with Iraq's nuclear program. When you read this section, and the conclusions at the end of the section, it is clear that, in order to reach unanimity, the committee pulled their punches. It may not be a whitewash, but the conclusions are a far cry from the actuality.
The body of the report makes it clear that the CIA analysts who prepared the intelligence reports concerning the famous aluminum tubes consciously fabricated supposed intelligence, interpreted intelligence in unlikely ways that supported the desired conclusions, reported known data selectively, reported data falsely, ignored other reports or failed to mention known reports that disputed their conclusions, lied about other data, lied about the results of their own experiments and lied about other known uses of the tubes in question. Their "National Intelligence Assessment" was a farrago of lies, distortions, half truths, selective data and knowingly improbable analysis. The reinterpretation of the data started in April 2001, and reached a peak in Sept. 2002.
With one exception the wording of the committee's conclusions gets no stronger than to state that various conclusions were wrong.
There is no way that the conclusions were wrong due to faulty intelligence or to lack of "humint". The conclusions were the result of conscious distortions, omissions and fabrications, but that is never stated. The commitee's understatements come pretty close to whitewash.
One should ask oneself why the CIA began to consciously and falsely reinterpret their intelligence starting in April 2001 if they were under no pressure to do so. Remember Paul O'Neal's input that discussions of war on Iraq started at Bush's first cabinet meeting. Do you think that is a coincidence?
Regretably the media has played along with the game rather than exposing the real meat of the report. If any of you doubt me I beg you to read the report for yourself, or at least read the section on the Nuclear Program to assure yourself that I am not exaggerating.
The administration didn't simply act on poor intelligence, they acted on intelligence that was consciously changed and falsified, and that was done so only after this administration took office. You can reach your own conclusions. I conclude that there was pressure to produce the desired intelligence, and that sycophants in the intelligence community responded to that pressure as desired. Intelligence was clearly fabricated to persuade Congress to support a war of choice, a decision they would not otherwise have made.
We cannot let such deceit continue to be the basis for national policy. America deserves better. Defeat this administration.
Yours, in shock,
Murray
